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Indian Peace Keeping Force

Posted in August 2nd, 2008 By

Indian Peace Keeping Force
भारतीय शान्ति सेना

IPKF First day cover released by the Government of India.

Active
July 1987–March 1990

Country
Sri Lanka

Allegiance
India

Branch
Indian Army
Indian Navy
Indian Air Force

Role
Peacekeeping
Counterinsurgency
Special operations

Size
100,000 (peak)

Engagements
Operation Pawan
Operation Viraat
Operation Trishul
Operation Checkmate

Decorations
One Param Vir Chakra
Six Maha Vir Chakras

Commanders

Notable
commanders
Lieutenant General Depinder Singh
Major General Harkirat Singh (General Officer Commanding)
Lieutenant General S.C. Sardeshpande
Lieutenant General A.R. Kalkat

Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF; Hindi: भारतीय शान्ति सेना) was the Indian military contingent performing a peacekeeping operation in Sri Lanka between 1987 and 1990. It was formed under the mandate of the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord signed between India and Sri Lanka in 1987 that aimed to end the Sri Lankan Civil War between militant Sri Lankan Tamil nationalists such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Sri Lankan military.

The force was initially not expected to be involved in any significant combat by the Indian High Command.

The IPKF began withdrawing from Sri Lanka in 1989, following the election of the Vishwanath Pratap Singh government in India and on the request of the newly-elected Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa. The last IPKF contingents left Sri Lanka in March 1990.

Contents

1 Background
- 1.1 Indian involvement and intervention
- 1.2 The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord
2 The mandate for the IPKF
3 The Indian Peace Keeping Force
- 3.1 IPKF Order of Battle
4 In Sri Lanka
5 Analysis
6 Impact
- 6.1 Assassination of Rajiv Gandhi
- 6.2 India’s foreign policy
7 Controversies
8 See also
9 References
- 9.1 Notes and Further reading
10 External links

Background

Sri Lankan Conflict

Background

Sri Lanka • History of Sri Lanka

Origins of the Civil War

Origins of the Civil War
Black July • Riots and pogroms
Human rights • Allegations of state terror
Tamil militant groups

LTTE

LTTE • Attacks • Expulsion of Muslims from Jaffna

Current major figures

Mahinda Rajapaksa
Velupillai Prabhakaran
Karuna Amman
Gotabaya Rajapaksa
Sarath Fonseka

Indian Involvement

Operation Poomalai
Indo-Sri Lanka Accord
Indian Peace Keeping Force
Rajiv Gandhi • RAW

See also

Military of Sri Lanka
TMVP • EPDP
Notable assassinations • Child soldiers
This box: view • talk • edit

Location of Sri Lanka

See also: Operation Poomalai

Sri Lanka, from the early 1980s, was facing increasingly violent ethnic strife in the Sri Lankan Civil War. The origins of the Sri Lankan Civil War can be traced to the independence of Sri Lanka in 1948, after the end of British rule. At the time, a Sinhalese majority government was instituted. This government passed legislation deemed discriminatory against the substantial Tamil minority in Sri Lanka.

In the 1970s, two major Tamil parties united to form the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), a separatist Tamil nationalist grop that agitated for a separate state of Tamil Eelam in north and eastern Sri Lanka that would grant the Tamils greater autonomy within the federal structure.

However, the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of Sri Lanka, enacted in August 1983, classified all separatist movements as unconstitutional,

Indian involvement and intervention

India had initially, under Indira Gandhi

The Sri Lankan government, deducing a decline in support for the Tamil rebels from India, started rearming itself extensively for its anti-insurgent role with support from Pakistan, Israel, Singapore, and South Africa.

Following the failure of the naval mission the decision was made by the Indian government to mount an airdrop of relief supplies in support of rebel forces over the besieged city of Jaffna. On 4 June 1987, in a show of force, the Indian Air Force mounted Operation Poomalai in daylight. Five Antonov An-32s under fighter cover flew over Jaffna to airdrop 25 tons of supplies, all the time keeping well within the range of Sri Lankan radar coverage. At the same time the Sri Lankan Ambassador to New Delhi was summoned to the Foreign Office to be informed by the Minister of State, External Affairs, K. Natwar Singh, of the ongoing operation and also indicated that the operation was expected not to be hindered by the Sri Lankan Air Force. The ultimate aim of the operation was both to demonstrate the credibility of the Indian option of active intervention to the Sri Lankan government, as a symbolic act of support for the Tamil rebels, as well to preserve Rajiv Gandhi’s credibility.

The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord

Main article: Indo-Sri Lanka Accord

Following Operation Poomalai, faced with the possibility of an active Indian intervention and lacking any possible ally, the President, J. R. Jayewardene, offered to hold talks with the Rajiv Gandhi government on future moves. that brought a temporary truce. Crucially however, the negotiations did not include the LTTE as a party to the talks.

The signing of the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord on 29 July 1987

The mandate for the IPKF

Among the provisions undersigned by the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord was the commitment of Indian military assistance should this be requested for by the Sri Lankan Government, as well as the provision —also if requested by Colombo— of an Indian Peace Keeping Force that would “guarantee and enforce the cessation of hostilities”. It was under these conditions that the IPKF entered Sri Lanka.

The Indian Peace Keeping Force

Originally a reinforced division with small naval and air elements, the IPKF at its peak deployed four divisions and nearly 100,000 men with one mountain (4th) and three Infantry Divisions (36th, 54th, 57th) as well as supporting arms and services. At the peak of its operational deployment, IPKF operations also included a large Indian Paramilitary Force and Indian Special Forces elements. Indeed Sri Lanka was first theatre of operation for the Indian Navy Commandos. The main deployment of the IPKF was in northern and eastern Sri Lanka. Upon its withdrawal from Sri Lanka the IPKF was renamed the 21st Corps and was headquartered near Bhopal and became a sort-of quick reaction force for the Indian army.

IPKF Order of Battle

Indian Army

The first Indian Army troops to be inducted into Sri Lanka were a ten thousand strong force from the 54th Infantry division, composed of elements of the Sikh Light Infantry, the Maratha Light Infantry and the Mahar Regiment which flew into Palay airbase ,

54th Air Assault Division. (Major General Harkirat Singh (General Officer Commanding), Brigadier Kulwant Singh, Dy GOC):- Became an infantry division later duie to lack of airlift capacity within the Indian armed forces.
- 10 Para Commando. (Jaffna) – an attached unit
- 65 Armoured Regiment (originally with T-54 tanks and later with T-72s). – an attached unit, it was later determined that the T55 was a better vehicle for counterinsurgency operations. Listed by some sources as an independent unit.
- 91 Infantry Brigade (Jaffna)
  - 5 Madras Bn
  - 8 Mahar Bn
  - 1 Maratha Light Infantry Bn
- 76 Infantry Brigade (Brigadier I.M. Dhar) (Munnar, Vavuniya, Mulliativu)
- 47 Infantry Brigade (Trincomalee-Batticoloa-Amparai)
36 Infantry Division.
- 115 Infantry Brigade.(Jaffna)
- 72 Infantry Brigade.(Jaffna)
- 4 Bn./5 Gorkha Regiment.
- 13 Sikh LI Bn.
- 41 Infantry Brigade. (Jaffna)
- 5 Rajputana Rifles
57th Infantry Division, trained in jungle warfare,
4th Mountain division, only two brigades used.
Independent Units
- 340 Independent Infantry Brigade (Amphibious). (Trincomalee)
- 18 Infantry Brigade. (Jaffna)
- 5 Para Battalion.

Indian Air Force

Soon after its intervention in Sri Lanka and especially after the confrontation with the LTTE, the IPKF received a substantial commitment from the Indian Air Force, mainly transport and helicopter squadrons, including:

No. 19 Squadron- Antonov An-32s
No 109 and No. 119 Helicopter Units – Mil Mi-8 helicopters.
No. 125 HU – Mil Mi-24s.
No. 664 AOP Squadron Chetak and Cheetah

Indian Navy

The Indian Navy regularly rotated naval vessels thru Sri Lanka waters, mostly smaller vessels such as patrol boats.

Naval Aviation
- No. 321 Squadron of the Indian Navy- HAL Chetaks
- No. 310 Squadron of the Indian Navy- Breguet Alizé
MARCOS (also the Marine Commando Force or MCF) – Took part in Operation Pawan (Hindi, “wind”) in 1988 and in the raid on an LTTE base at Guru Nagar. MARCOS operators (including Lt Singh) boarded two Gemini rafts off the coast of Jaffna City and towed two wooden rafts of explosives into a channel leading to the city’s Guru Nagar Jetty. Avoiding mines, eight men and two officers shifted to the wooden rafts and paddled to the jetty then fixed demolition charges to the jetty and LTTE speedboats. The commandos were detected but laid down suppressive fire and detonated the explosives before retreating to the Geminis without taking casualties. Two nights later, commandos swam back into the harbour amidst heavy patrolling by the LTTE to destroy the remaining speedboats. They were again detected and sustained minor injuries. These actions helped recapture Trincomalee and Jaffna harbours from the LTTE. For leading these actions the 30 year old Lt. Singh became the youngest officer to receive the Maha Vir Chakra Award.

Indian paramilitary forces

Central Reserve Police Force
Indian Coast Guard

In Sri Lanka

See also: Operation Pawan, Jaffna University Helidrop, Operation Trishul, Operation Viraat, and Operation Checkmate

The LTTE had enjoyed support from India till the IPKF started getting inducted.

Conflict with the LTTE

Two incidences that occurred in September-October 1987 marked the turning point of Indo-LTTE relationship. The first of these was the hunger strike and subsequent death of Lt. Col. Thileepan, a popular political wing leader of the LTTE, on 26 September 1987. Thileepan had begun his fast in protest against what was termed the failures of the Indian forces to satisfy the political demands of the Tamils,as:

Seize/destroy the LTTE radio/TV transmission equipment in the Jaffna Peninsula;

Seize or jam LTTE communication network;

Carry out raids on LTTE camps, caches and strong points;

Personnel manning LTTE offices in the East be detained and interrogated to gain information. In case of resistance,force to be used;

Actions to further consolidate hold of IPKF in the region.

It was declared on 9 October that the IPKF was to launch a final campaign against the LTTE. This was the point of no return.

Operation Pawan

Main article: Operation Pawan

The first of the major IPKF operation was launched on 9 October 1987. Codenamed Operation Pawan (Hindi:Wind), it was expected to neutralise the LTTE operations capability in and around Jaffna. This included the capture or neutralisation of the LTTE’s chain of command.

On October 10, the Indian 91st Brigade, consisting of three battalions and led by Brigadier J. Ralli, began its push into the city of Jaffna.

The Jaffna University Helidrop

Main article: Jaffna University Helidrop

The first battle signalling the real beginning of Operation Pawan was the Heliborne assault on Jaffna University head-quarters of the LTTE by a detachment of Indian Para Commandos and the Sikh LI on the night of 12 October. Jaffna University was the tactical headquarters of the LTTE. This was planned as a quick commando raid to capture the top LTTE leadership and local commanders who, based on Indian Intelligence, were supposed to be in the building at the time.

Battle for Jaffna

As the battle for Jaffna proggressed, the IPKF advance came under intense and vicious opposition from the Tigers. Fighting in built-up and an as-yet unevacuated Jaffna, the Indian High command insists that the slow advance was, in addition to Tiger resistance, more a result of reluctance on the part of the IPKF to use heavy weaponry to clear LTTE defences.

On October 15/16, the IPKF advance stopped its advance to stabilize the front. In addition, Palay, the major operations headquarters for the 54th Infantry Division, was secured from Tiger attacks. At this time the Indian Air Force undertook a massive airlift to reinforce the 91st with three brigades and heavy equipments including T-72 Tanks s and BMP-1 fighting vehicles. The improvised controllers worked round the clock to fly in troops and equipment. In addition, the Indian Airlines is said to have contributed, with its Boeing 737s transporting troops.

Now reinforced, the IPKF resumed the battle for Jaffna town. The tanks and armoured fighting vehicles are said to have been an effective protection against the anti-personnel mines. when they flew against LTTE positions in Chavakacheri village on October 23, 1987.

Ultimately however, after two weeks of bitter fighting, the IPKF had wrested the control of Jaffna and other major cities from the LTTE, but operations were to continue well into November, with major operations coming to an end with the fall of Jaffna Fort on the 28th of November.

By the time Jaffna fell, however, the LTTE had merely exfiltrated out of the town, moving south to the jungles of Vavuniya. Its hard core fighters moved to the safety of the jungles by skirting the coast of Jaffna from Point Pedro to Elephant Pass, sheltered by the impenetrable jungles and criss-cross waterways of the Nittkaikulam jungles.

This was however only the first of the IPKF’s three year campaign to neutralise the LTTE.

The IPKF at this point still consisted mostly of an overstretched 54th Division. Following the Jaffna Operation, the 36th Infantry Division was inducted, along with two additional brigades, to take over the Vavuniya sector and the Trincomalee-Batticaloa axis. This relieved the 54th Division which, led by Brigadier Manjit Singh, could now focus on consolidating the Jaffna sector. The 4th Mountain Division and the 57th Infantry Division were inducted still later in February 1988 to take charge of Vanni and Batticaloa from the 36th.

Within Jaffna sector, although the LTTE had shifted out of the town itself, it nevertheless harassed the 54th’s efforts to consolidate its positions using IEDs and anti-personnel mines. In turn, however, the IPKF was able to disrupt the LTTE’s activities with regular raids that led to capture of large caches of Rebel weaponry.

Operations Viraat and Trisul

Main articles: Operation Viraat and Operation Trishul

The major force of the Tigers’ fighting capacity had retreated to the jungles of Vavuniya following Operation Pawan. The Vavuniya sector was strategically and geographically key to accessing the North-South as well as East-West communications routes.

The LTTE was able to withstand the IPKF operations here as well, owing to natural cover from the dense jungles, an intimate knowledge of the terrain, and a low density of population which also probably held sympathy for the Tigers. The Vavuniya sector remained the most active sector throughout the IPKF’s deployment and its casualties in this area were the highest after those suffered during the operations in Jaffna. The LTTE also managed to carry out a large number of successful ambushes against the IPKF patrols in the dense jungles.

By summer the following year, the Indian High Command had evolved its doctrine from holding key strong points to conducting extensive search and destroy missions against LTTE strongholds and bases, denying them ground. In April 1988, the IPKF intiated two near simultaneous operations through the jungles of Northern Sri Lanka. These, codenamed Operation Viraat and Operation Trishul, were launched in the provinces of Mannar to Mullaitivu and Elephant Pass to Vavuniya

Sri Lankan Elections

Operation Baaz

Withdrawal from Sri Lanka

Ranasinghe Premadasa was elected President on 2 January 1989 and he on April 1989 demanded the IPKF withdraw within 3 months from Sri Lanka. In the 1989 elections both Premadasa and the SLFP wanted the IPKF to withdraw. They got 95% of the vote and Sinhala public opinion was against the accord. Rajiv Gandhi refused to withdraw the IPKF in a situation which clearly showed the failure of his Sri Lanka policy both diplomatically and militarily. Rajiv believed that the only way he could succeed was to politically force Premadasa and militarily force the LTTE to accept the accord. In December 1989 Indian elections V. P. Singh became the Prime Minister. He viewed Rajiv Gandhi’s Sri Lanka policy as a miserable failure as it had cost over 1100 soldiers, over 5000 Sri Lankan lives and cost over 20 billion (2000 crore) rupees of Indian tax payers money in over 32 months and both politically and militarily it was a stalemate.V. P. Singh withdrew the IPKF and the last ship left on 24 March 1990. The Tamils were now paradoxically unhappy at the IPKF’s departure but had to bear the start of a new ordeal. IPKF’s arrival in India was boycotted by the Tamil Nadu government headed by Karunanidhi.

The officers of the IPKF comprising all three services bid ‘Adieu’. End another chapter in Sri Lankan History.

Analysis

Casualties

The IPKF suffered around 1,255 killed in action and several thousands wounded. After several years, the Sri Lankan Armed Forces realised the role of IPKF and proposed building a memorial to the Indian dead in Sri Lanka. The LTTE casualties are not known reliably.

Performance

Intelligence Failures

The Indian intelligence agencies failed to consistently provide accurate information to the forces. One example is the Jaffna football ground massacre. The LTTE’s disinformation machinery leaked information to the Indian army that the LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran was hiding in a building near the Jaffna university football ground.

Impact

Whether it was successful militarily is an open question. On May 21, 1991, the LTTE assassinated Rajiv Gandhi for his role in sending the IPKF to Sri Lanka. The IPKF, although it shaped India’s counter-insurgency techniques and military doctrine considerably, in the international scene, does not find significant mention in National and international military doctrines. The political fallout, the IPKF’s casualties, as well as the deterioration of international relations has however shaped India’s foreign policy towards the Sri Lankan conflict. (see below)

Assassination of Rajiv Gandhi

The decision to send the IPKF in Sri Lanka was taken by then prime-minister of India, Rajiv Gandhi, who held office until 1989. While he was campaigning for re-election during the 1991 Indian General Election, the LTTE assassinated him at a rally that he was attending at Sriperumbudur on 21 May 1991. The assassination was carried out by a suicide bomber named Dhanu, who was a member of the LTTE.

India’s foreign policy

The debacle that was IPKF’s intervention in Sri Lanka is raised at times in Indian political discourse whenever the situation in Sri Lanka shows signs of deteriorating, and there is a question of intervening; or, in Sri Lankan politics (particularly by the LTTE), when it is proposed that India, or, more broadly, other foreigners, ought to have a role in promoting peace on the island nation. As a result, relations between India and Sri Lanka became extremely sour and India vowed never to offer any military help to Sri Lanka again. This policy has not been changed since and no defence pact has been signed between India and Sri Lanka. India has never been directly involved in the peace talks between the LTTE and Sri Lanka but has supported Norway’s efforts.

Controversies

Main article: IPKF Human Rights Violations

The IPKF’s role in the Sri Lankan conflict was much maligned by voices both there and at home at the time. It was alleged by the LTTE to have engaged in a number of incidents of human rights violation. Some neutral organisations also alleged the IPKF and LTTE to have engaged with scant regard for civilian safety and to have violated human rights. These allegations led to considerable outcry and public resentment within Sri Lanka as well as India, especially in Tamil Nadu, where the IPKF came to be viewed as an invading and oppressing force.

Indian forces were accused of indulging in number of civilian massacres, Involuntary disappearances and rapes during their time in the Northeastern province of Sri Lanka. These include allegations of involvement or complicity in the incidents noted below.

Valvettiturai massacre

On 2, 3, and 4 August 1989 over 50 Tamils were allegedly massacred by the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Valvettiturai, Jaffna. In addition to the killings over 100 homes, shops and other property were also burnt and destroyed. The bodies of 52 Tamils were identified, including seven children and six women. Over 100 homes, over 40 shops, 70 vehicles, fishing boats and nets were burnt and completely destroyed. The town of 15,000 people was empty following the massacre and more than 5,000 people took refuge in churches and schools. Allegedly, in the days following the massacre, attempts were made to cover up the killings, and few reporters managed to reveal the details of the massacre

Jaffna teaching hospital massacre

On October 22 1987 a few Tamil militants fired upon the advancing IPKF from within the hospital and made their escape by running through the hospital. The IPKF quickly raided the hospital on that day. However, when the IPKF entered the hospital there were no militant in the premises and no fighting. And yet, the IPKF massacred over 70 civilians. These civilians included patients, two doctors , three nurses and a pediatric consultant who were all in uniform. It is alleged that the pediatric consultant and two nurses were killed the following day (October 23) when they reported into duty. The hospital never completely recovered after this massacre.

Complicity in the Trincomalee massacre

Main article: Trincomalee massacre

According to Asian Times in August of 1987, a number of majority Sinhalese civilians were massacred Trincomalee. The then Sri Lankan government accused the Madras Regiment posted in the Trincomalee district of complicity, although the Indian officials denied responsibility, they withdrew the Madras Regiment from Trincomalee district.

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